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allegedly sustained to plaintiffs' goods stored in defend-
ant's warehouse and destroyed in a fire on July 24,1972. 
All of the plaintiffs set forth in their complaint a cause 
of action based in negligence on the part of the defendant 
as a warehouseman, claiming that the defendant was 
negligent in the operation of his warehouse and was re-
sponsible for their loss. Three of the plaintiffs, West-
inghouse Electric Corporation, Eldredge Furniture Com-
pany, Inc., and Mayer Segal, amended their complaint 
to also assert a claim that defendant was a common 
carrier with respect to them in addition to his status as 
a warehouseman and as a common carrier was liable to 
those plaintiffs without regard to negligence. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the end of the evidence, both the plaintiffs and 
the defendant moved the trial court for a determination 
as to the legal status of the defendant with respect to 
the three plaintiffs asserting the claim of common carrier 
relationship. The trial court found that the defendant 
was in the status of a common carrier with respect to 
plaintiff, Eldredge Furniture Company, Incv and di-
rected judgment on Eldredge's claim in the amount of 
$1,083.46 together with interest and plaintiff's costs. 
As to the plaintiff Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
and Mayer Segal, the court found that no relationship 
of common carrier existed and that the testimony elicited 
from both parties showed the legal status between the 
plaintiffs and the defendant to be one of warehouse-
man or bailee. 
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The trial court submitted the question of negligence 
) the jury for all plaintiffs with the exception of Eld-
edge Furniture Company, Inc. for whom a verdict was 
irected. The jury returned a special verdict finding 
he defendant was free from negligence in the operation 
•f his warehouse. Plaintiff, Eldredge Furniture Com-
)any, does not join in this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant/Respondent, William Emmel, requests 
this court affirm the trial court's ruling as to the com-
mon carrier relationship issue between Westinghouse 
and the defendant and affirm the judgment of no cause 
of action entered by the trial court upon the jury's find-
ing of no negligence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs' statement of facts generally represents 
the trial proceedings, but should be supplemented as 
follows. 
The defendant, William Emmel, provided three 
separate services for his customers. First, he unloaded 
the arriving goods from pooled railroad cars which had 
been forwarded by other agencies to the defendant for 
storage or further distribution. Second, prior to any 
further action, the defendant stored these goods in his 
warehouse. And, third, for some customers, delivered 
goods within his area of authority granted by the Pub-
lic Service Commission (R. 180, 181 & 182). 
3 
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With respect to the plaintiff, Westinghouse, defend-
ant testified that his procedure with Westinghouse when 
the consignees were contractors was to always call them 
to insure that they could accept delivery before he in 
fact delivered (B. 251 & 252). Mr. Emmel testified that 
on prior occasions he had attempted to make deliveries 
and found that he could not make delivery and accord-
ingly, he would contact the consignee, to whom the West-
inghouse goods were to be delivered, to insure that 
everything was ready before he took the goods out (B. 
252). Mr. Emmel also testified that prior to 1972, there 
had been occasions where he had had to hold Westing-
house's goods for an inordinate length of time before 
the consignee could accept the goods and had to charge 
them extra storage (B. 252). 
The defendant's warehouse, which was destroyed by 
fire, was locked and checked by Mr. Emmel prior to his 
departure on the Friday before the fire. All electrical 
appliances and lights, with the exception of one night 
light, were off (B. 244). No highly flammable goods or 
liquids were stored in the building over the weekend with 
the exception of one five gallon gasoline can stored near 
the front of the building which was not burned by the 
fire. The building was free from trash and accumula-
tion of debris on the Friday before the fire (B. 234 & 
2 4 5 ) . > , . , : : . . V , V; ;.../ - • - . . / W 
The fire department inspector, Dean Callister, did 
not testify as suggested by the appellant in his state-
ment of facts, at page 4, that the point of origin of the 
fire was the electrical switch boxes. In fact, Mr. Callister 
4 
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istified that the fire appeared to have burned up in 
a area in which the electrical switch boxes were located 
R. 211). The fire burned up from the floor at the point 
f origin (R. 211) and the electrical switch boxes were 
>cated on the wall (R. 211), at a height of approximately 
ix feet (R. 290). The appellants' suggestion that the 
ire's point of origin was in the electrical switch boxes, 
jid so testified to by Fire Department Inspector Callis-
er, is not supported by the record of Inspector Callis-
;er's testimony. Inspector Callister testified that the 
mise of the fire was undetermined (R. 216). He did 
lot testify that the cause of the fire was an electrical 
failure. 
The fire department examined the electrical fuse 
boxes that were removed by it to the fire department 
office by the Fire Chief (R. 217). The fire depart-
ment also investigated an electrical air conditioner at 
the scene of the fire (R. 218), noting that the wiring to 
the air conditioner as well as the wiring in the warehouse 
in general was contained in conduit (R. 219 & 217). 
As far as the fire department was concerned, Mr. 
Emmel's maintenance of his warehouse was not a cause 
of the fire (R. 211) and the defendant was complying 
with all fire department requirements and regulations 
prior to the fire (R. 215 & 216). The fire department 
made yearly inspections of Mr. Emmel's warehouse and 
the department investigator Dean Callister, testified 
that Mr. Emmel was complying with the safety standards 
required by the yearly inspection (R. 212 & 215). 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
City Electrical Inspector Chidester was unable to 
state that a faulty electrical system caused the fire on 
July 24, 1972, (R. 348), and was also unable to state 
that the fuse in which copper wire had been inserted 
rather than the normal fuse link caused the fire com-
plained of by the plaintiffs (R.342). Chidester also noted 
that the master switch panel in which the allegedly de-
fective fuses were maintained was an added extra pre-
caution that was not necessary under city requirements 
(R. 347, 348 & 388). Chidester was not in a position to 
say that the substitute copper wire in the fuses would 
"blow" faster or slower than regular fuse links (R. 345). 
Plaintiffs offered evidence consisting of a new fuse 
similar to the one, at least in size, that was contained in 
the master switch box prior to the fire (Exhibit 30-p). 
I t was noted that to inspect the fuse element one would 
have to shut off all the electrical power to the building, 
remove the fuse and unscrew the fuse end before the 
fuse link could be examined (R. 345, Exhibit 30-p). 
Defendant Emmel and his foreman, Grant Bartlett, 
testified that no fuse had been replaced by them, nor 
had a fuse ever been blown (R. 239, 240 & 291); and that 
there were no electrical problems or changes since the 
defendant bought the building (R. 239, 291 & 292) in 
1969. Defendant's foreman was aware of no electrical 
problems in the fuse box either before or after the de-
fendant purchased the building from Jack Noyce in 1969 
and could recall only one occasion when the air condi-
tioner tripped one of the breaker switches on the breaker 
panel (R. 291). The braker panel of switches provided 
$ 
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, 15 to 20 amp, safety capacity on the line prior to the 
aain switch box and the copper link fuses (R. 392). 
Two electrical engineers were called, Mr. Fackrell 
or the plaintiff and Mr. Bates for the defendant. Both 
hese engineers testified concerning their observations 
ind conclusions, particularly as to the fuses and their 
copper wire fuse links. Appellant states on page 5 of 
lis brief in the Statement of Facts that his expert testi-
fied that No. 18 wire in the fuses could cause the No. 8 
vire outside the main switch box to burn the result in 
i fire. Respondent suggests that Mr. Fackrell did not 
state that a hot No. 8 wire would start a fire, but rather 
that he had made no tests to determine whether the wire 
got hot enough to even start cardboard on fire (R. 369). 
Both Mr. Fackrell and Mr. Bates, defendant's elec-
trical engineer, agreed that the copper wires in the fuses 
blew as would any fuse link. They disagreed on the 
time that would be required or the amount of amperage 
crossing the wires for such an occurrence to take place. 
Mr. Fackrell could not say whether the fire caused a 
fault in the system out beyond the main switch box which 
created an overload and "blew" the copper wires in the 
fuses or whether there was a fault in the system and the 
copper wires got hot enough to start the fire (R. 371 
& 373). 
Mr. Bates was of the opinion, after a question put 
to him by defendant's counsel, which contained the testi-
mony as to the condition of the building, the condition 
of the wiring and the condition of the appliances in the 
building at the time of the fire, that the fire was not of 
7 
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electrical origin, but rather the copper wire in the fuses 
in question "blew" when the fire itself caused the elec-
trical system to short (B. 395 & 396). 
: The trial court on plaintiffs' motion for new t r i a l 
on the basis of newly discovered evidence, found that the 
offered evidence did not comply with Rule 59 (a) (4) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the plaintiff did 
not show that the newly discovered evidence could not 
have been obtained with reasonable diligence or dis-
covered prior to trial. Apparently, Mr. Jack Noyce, would 
have been called to testify that the fuses were never 
improvised during the time he owned the business, that 
information coming from an affidavit produced by one 
of the plaintiffs, Dale R. Holbrook, of Lakewood Home 
Furnishings, Inc., (R. 22). There was no showing to 
the trial judge on the motion that plaintiffs had ever 
attempted to contact Mr. Noyce prior to the trial or 
subpoena him for the trial or that such evidence would 
have had any material effect on the outcome of the 
trial (R. 20). 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT WAS A WAREHOUSEMAN 
AS TO ALL PLAINTIFFS WITH THE EX-
CEPTION OF ELDREDGE FURNITURE 
COMPANY, INC., AND DID NOT STAND IN 
THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP OF COMMON 
CARRIER TO WESTINGHOUSE, 
The trial court ruled, that of the three plaintiffs 
claiming that defendant was a common carrier in relation 
to them, only Eldredge Furniture Company, Inc. and the 
8 
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efendant were in that legal relationship. The court found 
hat the course of dealing as evidenced by the testimony 
rom both Mr. Whittemore, the operations manager for 
Westinghouse, and Mr. Emmel, the defendant, did not 
create the legal status of common carrier (See trial 
court's ruling, R. 406, 407 & 408). 
At the time of the fire, it is defendant's position 
uhat he was in the capacity of a warehouseman in his 
relationship with the plaintiff Westinghouse and that 
the course of dealing between Westinghouse, the defend-
ant, and the ultimate consignees of Westinghouse di-
rected the trial court to such a conclusion. 
Plaintiff, Eldredge, testified that separate charges 
were made for each service (R, 181 & 182), and Mr. 
Emmel testified that he received Westinghouse's goods, 
stored them in his warehouse until delivery was request-
ed by the consignees (R. 251 & 252). The course of deal-
ings which had been established prior to the fire with 
respect to Westinghouse's goods was that the goods would 
be unloaded and stored in the warehouse and held there 
until such time as the consignee or ultimate purchaser 
requested the defendant make delivery. There were 
even times when Westinghouse's goods were delayed so 
long in the warehouse th^t Mr. Emmel made additional 
storage charges (R. 252). 
Even plaintiff Westinghouse's operations manager, 
Mr. Edward C. Whittemore, testified thftt Mr. Emmel 
would contact the contractor to find out if he was ready 
for them and if the contractor was able to take Westing-' 
0 
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house's merchandise, Mr. Emmel would deliver it, If 
they were not ready, Mr. Emmel would hold the goods 
until the ultimate purchaser could handle it. Mr. Whitte-
more testified as follows (E, 193, lines 1-30 & 194, lines 
1-8): 
Q. What if they are not ready for them? [The 
goods] 
A. That's when Mr. Emmel would contact the 
contractor and find out if he was ready for 
them. Why then, he would deliver them. 
Q. But if they weren't ready, he would not deliver 
them ? He would hold them until the ultimate 
purchaser could handle it? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now, do you know whether or not Mr. Emmel 
shipped any of these goods out of his ware-
house? I am not talking about these goods. 
Obviously, these goods were not shipped any-
where. Prior to this time. In trying to es-
tablish a procedure that had been going on, 
business relationship between your company 
and Mr. EmmePs company, do you know 
whether or not Mr. Emmel contacted these 
contract purchasers before making any ship-
ments? 
A. Yes.. ,. 
Q. As a matter of course? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In other words, they would not come into his 
warehouse. He would unload them on his 
truck and drive on out? 
A. No, I would say not. 
10 
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Q. Because he would get out there and find out 
they couldn't use them and bring them back? 
A. That is right. 
Q. With respect to these, you do not know 
whether these contractors were ready to take 
this equipment on the day they came in his 
warehouse or not? You have no information 
concerning that? 
. A. Only by what Mr. Emmel said. 
Q. What did Mr. Emmel say? 
A. He said he contacted one of our dealers there. 
Q. Who is "one of our dealers"" 
A. I am not sure whether it is Don Christensen 
or Showcase Homes. 
Q. Do you know? 
A. No, I don't. They said that is where he was, 
either debating to unload the railroad car or 
not. 
Mr. Emmel testified that it was the general pro-
cedure with Weistinghouse goods to insure that delivery 
could be accomplished and that he contacted the ultimate 
consignee prior to delivery (K. 251). 
In attempting to determine whether or not the course 
of dealings between the defendant and the plaintiff, 
Westinghouse, created the legal status of common car-
rier, the respondent would direct the Court's attention 
to 13 AmJur 2d 762, § 255. It will be noted that for the 
status of common carrier to attach to a relationship be-
tween two parties there must be immediate transporta-
tion and a delay for the earner's convenience. 
11 
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A completed delivery to the carrier of the prop-
erty to be transported is necessary to establish 
the legal relation of carrier and shipper. When 
such a delivery had been made to, and accepted 
by, the carrier, the liability of the common carrier 
commences eo instanti. The fact that the goods 
which are delivered for immediate transportation 
are detained at the carrier^ warehouse pending 
the arrival of a vehicle on which to ship them, or 
for the carrier's temporary convenience, does not 
prevent the carrier becoming liable as such or 
reduce its liability to that of a warehouseman 
only. In such case, the deposit is a mere acces-
sory to the carriage and does not postpone the 
commencement of its liability as a common carrier 
to the time when they are actually put in motion 
towards the place of their destination. However, 
where there is no completed delivery and accept-
ance of the goods, the carrier, despite the custody 
of the goods, is liable only as a warehouseman 
therefore in the absences of any contract, ex-
pressed or implied, to the contrary. (Emphasis 
added) 
The criteria in establishing the general responsi-
bility of a carrier requires first that the goods are being 
delivered to the warehouse for immediate transporta-
tion and if they are detained in the carrier's warehouse, 
that the delay be for the convenience of the carrier and 
not that of the shipper or ultimate consignee. In, the 
case of Westinghouse's goods, they were not placed with 
the defendant for immediate transportation and they were 
not detained in the defendant's warehouse for the de-
fendant's convenience but rather for the convenience of 
the ultimate consignee or purchaser. It will be recalled 
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:hat Mr. Whittemore testified as well as Mr; Emmel 
that the procedure was that Mr. Emmel would call to 
insure that delivery could be accomplished and if for 
some reason it could not, the goods would be retained 
in the warehouse until such time as the consignee could 
take them. Therefore, it does not appear that the goods 
were placed with the defendant for immediate transpor-
tation, but on the contrary, placed with him for trans-
portation when it could be accepted by the consignee 
and that it was not the defendant's convenience that was 
being served by the retention of the goods in the ware-
house, but the convenience of the ultimate consignee. 
The appellants cite to the Court cases involving 
forwarders indicating that this is a similar arrangement 
to defendant's business. Forwarders, as opposed to 
warehousemen, collect goods from various shippers and 
make up either truckloads or rail carloads of goods to a 
similar destination. The respondent was not in the busi-
ness of assembling merchandise or property from var-
ious sources to make up a carload and ship them to a 
common destination, but rather his business was dis-
assembly of a carload which had been made up by some 
forwarder of various property to store in his warehouse 
for either pickup or delivery as requested. The respond-
ent submits that oases holding that a forwarder is a 
carrier have no application to the case on appeal before 
this Court. 
This Court has recognized and accepted the prop-
osition that a business venture may deal in one legal 
13 
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status with a customer at one time and another legal 
status with the same customer at another time. Represent-
ative of that case is Allen vs. Southern Pacific Company, 
117 Utah 171, 213 P2d 667 (1950). In that case, the plain-
tiff, Frank J. Allen brought an action against Southern 
Pacific Company to recover $2,190.00 for a traveling bag 
and contents which were lost from the Southern Pacific 
Company's checkroom in the railroad station. One part 
of the appeal considered whether or not a railroad, 
which held itself out to be a carrier, in maintaining a 
checkroom at their check station was acting in the ca-
pacity of a warehouseman rather than a common carrier. 
This Court held that in maintaining a checkroom to 
store plaintiff's goods while it was being readied for an 
interstate journey, the railroad was acting as a ware-
houseman rather than a common carrier. The court 
stated: 
A checkroom business is no part of the business 
of the common carrier and when it acts in that 
capacity, it is acting as a warehouseman. 
This Court, in Allen vs. Southern Pacific Company, 
supra., recognized the fact that a carrier as to the stor-
age of goods can be considered a warehouseman and can 
be acting in a dual capacity of carrier and warehouse-
man. 
Appellant, in his brief on page 20, attempts to dis-
tinguish Allen vs. Southern Pacific Company, supra., 
stating that a separate payment for checkroom service 
was charged in Allen vs. Southern Pacific Company, 
14 
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supra., indicating that a separate charge is not the cus-
tom in the instant case. It will be recalled that plaintiff, 
Eldredge, testified that there was a separate charge for 
delivery. Other state jurisdictions have held that a 
common carrier can become a warehouseman under cir-
cumstances where the carrier undertakes to store the 
shipper's goods and the standard of care that at tache 
to the carrier under those circumstances, is a standard 
of care required of a warehouseman. In these cases, 
the carriers held themselves out to be carriers and not 
warehousemen as opposed to the instant situation where 
the defendant holds himself out to be a warehouseman 
as to plaintiff Westinghouse's goods and not a carrier 
at the time of the fire. 
Even if we were to assume for the sake of argu-
ment, that the defendant as to Westinghouse was in the 
status of carrier, the facts and situations surrounding 
delivery and the manner in which they were delivered 
would take the defendant out of the status of carrier and 
place him into the status of a warehouseman, as sug-
gested by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen vs. Southern 
Pacific Company, supra. The general rule as applied 
in these other jurisdictions is well stated in 13 AmJur 
2d, Carriers, §404, page 887. 
SECTION 404. GOODS RETAINED AT THE 
REQUEST OF CONSIGNEE. 
Where goods have arrived at their destina-
tion, and at the request and for the convenience 
of the consignee are allowed to remain in the 
custody of the carrier, its liability as an insurer 
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of the goods ceases and becomes thereafter that 
of a warehouseman or a depository. 
. . . Moreover, where common carriers have con-
sented without additional compensation to retain 
the further custody of freight for the owner's 
accommodation and at his special request, it has 
been held that their liability as common carrier 
ceases and thereafter, they are liable only as 
gratuitous bailees or depositories, bound to use 
good faith but, having done so, liable for loss only 
in case of gross neglect, unless they have entered 
into some special engagement relative thereto 
which indicates the degree of responsibility they 
are to sustain, or have subsequent to the arrival of 
the freight contracted for and storage for hire, 
in which they are bound to use ordinary diligence 
and are liable for loss by ordinary neglect. 
Representative of that position is the case of Bail-
way Express Agency vs. Schoen, 70 Ariz. 87, 216 P2d 
420 (1950). That case included an action by plaintiff 
Schoen against Railway Express Agency for damage to 
a shipment of costume jewelry which had been trans-
ported by a common carrier and stored in the common 
carrier's warehouse at the request of the plaintiff until 
final shipment could be made. The Supreme Court of 
Arizona held that when the goods have arrived at their 
destination and remain in the custody of the common 
carrier in accordance with a request by the consignee, the 
carrier holds those goods as a warehouseman and its 
liability must be determined under the law of a ware^ 
houseman. 
During the period of nearly four months that 
defendant held plaintiff's goods stored in its 
warehouse in Dallas, it held them as a warehouse^ 
man, not as a carrier, and hence its liability must 
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be determined under the law of bailments. This 
rule is stated in 9 AmJur, Carriers, § 687; " . . . 
The authorities are in harmony in holding that 
when goods have arrived at their destination, and 
at the request and for the convenience of the con-
signee are allowed to remain in the custody of 
the carrier, its liability as an insurer of the goods 
thereupon ceases and becomes thereafter ordi-
narily that of a warehouseman, or depository. . . ." 
93 Corpus Juris Secundum, Warehousemen and Safe 
Depositories, § 2, page 397, makes further distinction 
and reference as to the status of a warehouseman where-
in he transportsg0odsK states: 
c. Distinctions 
A person who receives goods under a contract 
which constitutes him a warehouseman is not 
transformed into a common carrier by reason of 
undertaking to transport the goods to his ware-
house. 
Since a warehouseman is of a class of bailees 
known as paid agents, exercising private employ-
ments whose liability and relation are essentially 
different from those of a common carrier, where 
a person receives goods under a contract which 
constitutes him a warehouseman, as discussed 
supra Sec. 1, he is not transformed into a common 
carrier by reason of his undertaking to transport 
the goods to his warehouse, or to forward the 
goods by direction of the owner; and on the other 
hand, a carrier which stores goods merely as inci-
dental to the transportation thereof is not a ware-
house, although by reason of its acts, the carrier 
may, in some circumstances be held to the liability 
of a warehouseman, as discussed in Carriers, Sec. 
16, 157, 884. Where a warehouseman who is also 
a common carrier, on termination of the storage 
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contract undertakes to deliver the goods, he as-
sumes the relation of a common carrier from the 
time of the acceptance of the order for transporta-
tion. (Emphasis added) 
Applying the foregoing to the relationship between 
Westinghouse and the defendant, we find that the de-
fendant in the course of his dealings with all his cus-
tomers holds himself out as a warehouseman at certain 
points and for those customers for whom he delivers 
during the course of delivery holds himself out as a com-
mon carrier. As separate charges for storage and trans-
portation were made, and as the goods where not de-
livered until request of the ultimate consignee, to whom 
they were to be delivered by the defendant, and as West-
inghouse's goods were in storage at the time of the fire, 
and they were not in the process of delivering to the 
ultimate consignees, defendant's status is one of ware-
houseman and not carrier, and that the trial court acted 
properly in determining the same and properly instruct-
ed the jury as to the standard of care attached to- a ware-
houseman for the protection of the goods stored in his 
Warehouse. 
The appellant in Point II, of the Argument portion 
of his brief indicates that Westinghouse's claim for com-
mon carrier status is equal to or better than Eldredge 
for whom the trial court granted summary judgment 
against the defendant. The record indicates that the 
normal fashion of proceeding between the defendant and 
the plaintiff, Eldredge Furniture Company, Inc., was 
that the defendant would generally deliver those goods 
as they arrived in his warehouse without contacting the 
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plaintiff Eldredge (R. 251). In the case of Eldredge, 
the delivery except with big orders was immediate and 
most certainly substantially different than the relation-
ship between Westinghouse and the defendant. Both 
Mr. Whittemore and Mr. Emmel testified that no goods 
were delivered for Westinghouse to the ultimate con-
signees until such time as the consignees had been con-
tacted and had indicated a willingness to accept the 
goods at a specified time. 
Applying the Eldredge relationship to the two cri-
teria for a carrier relationship attaching, to wit: im-
mediate transportation and carrier's convenience, we 
find that the defendant generally immediately trans-
ported the goods to plaintiff Eldredge and that generally 
there were no delays in the transportation. With West-
inghouse the goods were not placed for immediate trans-
portation, but for transportation when the consignees 
could accept the same and the delay was not for the de-
fendant's convenience but rather for the convenience of 
the consignee. 
Both plaintiff Westinghouse and the defendant Em-
mel considered the arrangement between them to be one 
for storage and for transfer and that at the time of the 
fire, the goods were in storage and not in transfer and 
the legal status of warehouseman, as opposed to carrier, 
attached to the defendant. 
POINT I I 
THE DEFENDANT AS A BAILEE/WARE-
HOUSEMAN SUSTAINED HIS BURDEN 
THAT THE FIRE WAS NOT DUE TO HIS 
NEGLIGENCE. 
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The case with respect to all plaintiffs, with the ex-
ception of Eldredge Furniture Company, Inc., for whom 
summary judgment was granted against the defendant, 
was submitted to the jury under the theory of bailor/ 
bailee relationship (warehouseman for hire) under ap-
propriate instructions. The jury was given a special ver-
dict wherein they were to answer the following question: 
Was the defendant, William Emmel, free from 
negligence in the operation of his warehouse? 
The jury was to answer either "yes" or "no". The 
jury on its special verdict answered "yes" finding that 
the defendant was free from negligence in the operation 
of his warehouse (R. 27). 
The question of defendant's negligence and whether 
or not he conducted himself in a manner constituting 
negligence or not constituting negligence was certainly 
a question for the jury, and the trial court properly sub-
mitted the issue to them. 
The trial court properly submitted the case to the 
jury under instructions stating that the burden of non-
persuasion, or the burden of proof was with the defend-
ant as opposed to the normal course where the burden 
of proof is upon the plaintiff. The cases cited on page 
25 of appellants' brief indicate that the defendant has 
the burden of proof and the trial court so instructed the 
jury. In instruction No. 7 (R. 62), the court instructed 
the jury that the party on whom the burden of proof 
rests must sustaip their burden of proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence and that if the pftrty upoii whom 
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;he burden of proof fails to meet the burden or if the 
evidence is evenly balanced the jury must find that the 
burden has not been met and rule against the party hav-
ing the burden of proof. In instruction No. 10 (R. 86), 
the t r i a l court, in line with Utah decisions on bailment, 
properly instructed the jury that where a bailment situa-
tion arises as in the case before them, the bailee or ware-
houseman has the burden of proof by a preponderance 
that the warehouseman did exercise the degree of care 
required to protect the bailor's property. 
The trial court did not submit the issue of proxi-
mate cause to the jury, but held that the inference raised 
under the bailor/bailee relationship carries with it the 
inference of proximate cause with the inference of negli-
gence, thus placing a greater burden upon the defendant 
than perhaps required under the current Utah Supreme 
Court cases covering bailment. 
In this case, as in all bailment cases in Utah, the 
risk of ndnpersuasion falls to the defendant, and the 
plaintiff has no reason to complain for the instructions 
3n the law of this State concerning bailment, as given 
to the jury. 
POINT III. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO 
HAVE A FULL-TIME SECURITY GUARD 
OR AN AUTOMATIC SPRINKLING SYS-
TEM FOR FIRE PROTECTION. 
The appellants suggest to the Court that the fact 
that there was no sprinkling system on the premises, that 
there were no full-time security guards and the premises 
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were without inspection for three days, constitute negli-
gence as a matter of law. 
The respondent submits that these are issues to be 
considered by the jury in their deliberations as to whe-
ther or not the defendant/warehouseman was free from 
negligence in the operation of his warehouse and not an 
issue which is to be decided as a matter of law. Cer-
tainly, reasonable minds could differ as to whether or 
not under certain circumstances automatic systems are 
advisable or whether security guards are required. 
Whether or not the defendant went to the warehouse 
to make inspections during the course of the three days 
seems to have little relevancy. Had he gone on Satur-
day or Sunday, the fire was not in progress and unless 
he was fortunate enough to happen to be on the premises 
on July 24, 1972, a few hours before 10:45 when the fire 
apparently was under way, an inspection during the 
three day period by the defendant would have been mean-
ingless. 
On page 24 of appellants' brief, in addition to the 
complaints that there were no security guards and no 
sprinkling system, the appellants complain that the de-
fendant left his warehouse for three days knowing that 
it was full of expensive combustible material belonging 
to bailors for hire. The record does not reflect that that 
evidence as such was ever before the court. Certainly 
the materials stored in his warehouse were combustible 
as is all material, but it was not extremely flammable 
and there were no extremely flammable items stored in 
the warehouse. 
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There was also no evidence in the record that the 
varehouse at 736 West on 3rd South is remotely located 
md the street upon which Mr. Enamel's warehouse is 
ocated most certainly is a through street running be-
ween 4th South and 3rd South at approximately 736 
i^est. Appellants complain that there were no signs on 
he premises and that there was difficulty in finding who 
>wned the premises, appears to be completely irrelevant 
o the issue of negligence unless the appellant feel that 
he defendant could have more properly responded to 
he fire than the fire department itself. The same rea-
oning applies to the location of the defendant's address 
md the fact that it was 20 minutes from the warehouse. 
The fact that the defendant did not have a sprin-
ting system, and the fact that he had no full-time security 
guards, and the fact that he was not on the premises for 
hree days prior to the fire, over the long week-end, do 
>ot constitute negligence as a matter of law. Numerous 
urisdictions hold that a warehouseman who does not 
ave a sprinkling system or a night watchman is not 
egligent as a matter of law and that those elements are 
actors to be taken into account by a jury in determining 
whether or not negligence exists. 
. Bepresentative of those well reasoned cases art 
lipps vs. Heming, 167 Colo. 358, 447 P2d 700 (1968). 
^aintiff Hipps was an appliance retailer who appealed 
rom a judgment in favor of the defendant Henning, a 
warehouseman, where plaintiff's goods had been dam-
ged and otherwise lost in a warehouse fire at defend-
nt's place of business. The trial court founds that there 
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was a presumption of negligence on the part of the de-
fendant and to rebut that presumption, the defendant 
produced testimony that the warehouse was old, but in 
good condition; that the wiring which was hung from the 
ceiling had been removed and new fixtures had been 
installed, and most of the wooden floor had been covered 
by four inches of reinforced concrete. The defendant 
also produced evidence that there were 16 soda ash fire 
extinguishers in the building, all of which had been 
charged within six or eight months prior to the fire. 
Testimony further showed that the building was kept 
clear of debris and rubbish and the fire inspector testified 
that they found no fault with the condition and operation 
of the warehouse so far as a fire hazard was concerned. 
The plaintiff argued on appeal that some of the 
findings of the trial court should have been as a matter 
of law. Plaintiff pointed out that the trial court found 
that the warehouse was operated in an old remodeled 
building and there was neither a night watchman nor 
automatic fire prevention equipment, and that there was 
no one on duty at all time to operate the existing manual 
equipment. 
The Colorado Supreme Court stated that they could 
not, as a matter of law, state that all warehousemen must 
employ a night watchman, or put in an automatic sprin-
kler system and that the failure to do so subjects the 
warehouseman as a matter of law to liability for any 
fire which occurs on the premises. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in the same case ap-
plied the same rule as has the Utah Supreme Court hold-
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ng that issues of negligence and proximate cause are 
o be resolved by the trier of fact, and that only in the 
dearest cases, and where reasonable minds could only 
Iraw but one inference from the facts, can the appellate 
lourt reach a conclusion from that reached by the trier 
>f facts as to what constitutes reasonable care. See Gibbs 
is. Blue Cab Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P2d 213 (1952). 
Also representative of the portion that the question 
>f a warehouseman's negligence is one for the trier of 
act and that failure to have a night watchman is not 
Legligence as a matter of law is Cole vs. Younger, 58 
tfM 211, 269 P2d 1096 (1954). In that case, the owner of 
Lousehold goods brought suit against a warehouseman 
or the loss of the household goods which were destroyed 
n a fire of unknown origin. The trial court directed a 
erdict for the warehouseman; the plaintiff appealed. 
Lmong other things, the New Mexico Supreme Court 
teld that the warehouseman had the burden of proof and 
hat there was sufficient evidence to establish that the 
warehouseman had exercised that degree of care, Hav-
ag determined that the burden of proof was on, the ware-
ouseman to prove due care, the New Mexico Supreme 
?ourt noted that the warehouseman introduced testi-
lony to show, among other things, that there was no 
debris or accumulation of waste of any kind around the 
•remises, that the building was of corrugated iron and 
letal frame and that the inspection of the fire chief 
howed the goods to have been properly stored insofar 
.s the official could determine. The evidence showed 
hat there was no night watchman as such. The Court 
tated that the defendant was not required to show the 
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cause of the fire, it was difficult to conceive of other proof 
that might be demanded of a defendant to sustain his 
burden of proof. The Court concluded that the defend-
ant had successfully carried the burden of proof on the 
issue of due care and as there was no evidence of any 
sort to the contrary, and the trial court was proper in 
directing a verdict on behalf of the warehouseman against 
plaintiff. 
The following jurisdictions have determined that 
the failure to have an automatic sprinkling system or a 
night watchman do not constitute negligence as a matter 
of law. Bellows vs. Worche-ster Storage Company, 297 
Mass. 188, 7 N.E. 2d 588 (1937); Jordan vs. Federal Com-
press and Warehouse Company, 156 Miss. 514, 216 So. 
31 (1930); Gutknecht vs. Wagner Brothers Moving and 
Storage Company, 266 S.W. 2d 19. (Mo. 1954); Fry vs. 
Wagner Brothers Moving and Storage Company, 267 
S.W. 2d 359 (Mo. 1954); Niagra Fire Insurance Com-
pany vs. Dodd River Boat Service, Inc., 187 F.Supp. 528 
(D.C. Ala., 1960). 
It was noted in Brown vs. Sloan Moving & Storage, 
296 S.W. 2d 20 (Mo. 1956), that the damage by water 
from an automatic sprinkler system to household goods 
outweighed the protection which a sprinkler might pro-
vide against fire. The record indicates that the defend-
ant, Mr. Emmel, had that consideration in mind when 
determining whether or not to install a sprinkler system 
in his own warehouse (E. 243). 
The fire department inspector, Dean Oallister, testi-
fied that the building was constructed generally of con-
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rete, that the interior walls were concrete block as well 
s the exterior walls, that the beams were of steel and 
rood (R. 204), and that the construction was generally 
1 line with other warehouses in the area (R. 207). There 
rere routine yearly inspections (R. 206) in which proper 
tacking was looked for by fire department inspectors, 
/iring, furnaces, and trash accumulation as well as 
lammable liquids were looked for (R. 214), and that in 
lese inspections the items which might lead to fire 
az-ard were all in order (R. 215). The fire department 
lvestigator concluded that the maintenance and upkeep 
f the building was not a cause of the fire (R.211). 
The defendant himself testified that the building was 
ibstantially constructed of concrete or concrete block 
R. 232); that there were no flammable materials stored 
a the premises (R. 234); that the skylights were of a 
)ft green plexiglass (R. 235); that there were trash 
mtainers for the limited amount of trash that was ac-
imulated in the warehouse and that it was swept every 
ay (R. 237); that there were no incinerators around 
Le warehouse (R, 237); that there were no prior fires 
L the warehouse to the defendant's knowledge (R. 238); 
tat he had had no electrical problems; and, that his 
3ods were stacked away from the electrical conduit con-
lining the electrical wiring (R. 239 & 241). The de-
mdant also maintained fire extinguishers in the build-
ig (R. 241), and he prevented smoking in the warehouse 
:ea proper (R. 243). 
Mr. Enamel, as well as his foremen, George Bartlett, 
istified concerning the precautions taken by other ware-
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houses throughout the area. Mr. Emmel noted that 
sprinklers are not standard in all warehouses (E. 243), 
and he was familiar with other warehouses that did not 
maintain full-time security guards (K. 244). 
The plaintiffs attempted at various stages through 
the proceedings to try and link the defendant or his em-
ployees to the improvised fuse link contained in the main 
switch box, but were unsuccessful. Plaintiffs' attempts 
to show that the fuse caused the fire were unsuccessful 
especially in view of the fact that the defendant produced 
an electrical engineer who testified under the facts of 
the case as supplied to him in defendant's counsel's hypo-
thetical question which was based upon the testimony 
from Mr. Emmel concerning the status of the warehouse 
prior to the fire, that electricity or any electrical failure 
was not the cause of the fire, but that an electrical failure 
occurred because of the fire. Plaintiff's contention that 
no evidence was presented by the defendant to exclude 
the suspected electrical causes of the fire or negligence 
therewith is in error. 
The record, with the exception of defendant's elec-
trical expert who testified to the contrary, is devoid of 
any assertions by any of the witnesses, including plain-
tiffs' electrical expert, the city electrical inspector and 
the Salt Lake City Fire Department Inspector that the 
fire was a result of an electrical failure. The cause of the 
fire was undetermined. 
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Defendant's action in maintaining his warehouse in 
le manner in which he so did, including what fire pre-
ention devices he may have provided or failed to pro-
ide constitute a jury question and was properly sub-
dtted to the jury and there is no compelling fact upon 
hich reasonable minds cannot differ that should require 
lis Court to hold, as a matter of law, that the defendant 
as negligent in the operation of his warehouse. 
POINT IV. 
A WAREHOUSEMAN IS ONLY LIABLE 
FOR DAMAGES FOR LOSS OR INJURY TO 
GOODS WHERE HE HAS FAILED TO EX-
ERCISE A DEGREE OF CARE IN REGARD 
TO THOSE GOODS AS A REASONABLY 
CAREFUL MAN WOULD UNDER LIKE 
CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The standard of care required of a warehouseman 
one of ordinary care, or the same care that a reason-
)ly -careful owner of similar goods would provide, 
arious jurisdictions throughout the country, including 
tah, generally apply the standard of ordinary care to 
warehouseman for the protection of goods stored. A 
ineral statement of the law is found in 56 AmJur § 128 
ige 379, which provides: 
LOSS DUE TO NEGLIGENCE OF A WARE-
HOUSEMAN. A warehouseman is required to 
exercise due care or a reasonable degree of pru-
dence for the protection and preservation of 
goods stored with him, and is liable for a loss 
• : or an injury for a failure to exercise such care. 
Indeed, even if the loss is due to an act of God, 
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if the negligence of a warehouseman commingles 
with and operates as a contributive element, proxi-
mate to the injury, the warehouseman is liable. 
In this regard, due or reasonable care has been 
defined as that degree of care which a reasonably 
careful person would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances with respect to similar property own-
ed by himself, or, according to some statements, 
which reasonably prudent warehousemen are ac-
customed to exercise under similar circumstances. 
The State of Utah has adopted by statute a similar 
standard at 70A-7-204, Utah Code Annotated 1953, As 
Amended. This provision of the Uniform Commercial 
Code sets out the standard of care required by a ware-
houseman as follows: 
DUTY OF CAKE — Contractual limitation of 
warehouse man's liability. - (1) A warehouseman 
is liable for damages for loss of or injury to the 
goods caused by his failure to exercise such care 
in regard to them as a reasonably careful man 
would exercise under like circumstances, but unless 
otherwise agreed, he is not liable for damages 
which could not have been avoided by the exercise 
of such care. 
The defendant, by his own testimony, concerning the 
manner of operation and construction of the warehouse, 
through the testimony of his foreman, Grant Bartlett, 
concerning the procedures and operation of similar ware-
houses throughout the area, and the testimony of the 
fire inspector, Dean Callister, that the warehouse met 
the requirements of the fire department and that prior 
inspections revealed no hazards, all went to show that 
the defendant operated his warehouse in a manner which 
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as in conformation with the duty of care imposed upon 
im both by statute and common law. There was no evi-
3nce from the plaintiffs that the manner in which the 
arehouse was operated, maintained, or constructed was 
ss 'than the standard of care required of the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, William Emmel, submits that the 
ial court properly found that no relationship of com-
on carrier existed between the defendant and West-
ghouse under the facts elicited from the testimony of 
e parties and did not err in sending Westinghouse's 
aim against the defendant to the jury. 
On the issue of negligence, the trial court properly 
Lbmitted those issues to the jury as a question of fact 
hose finding that the defendant was free from negli-
mce in the operation of his warehouse was fully sup-
•rted by the evidence. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
HANSON, WADSWORTH & RUSSON 
Attorney for Respondent 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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